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Introduction
The discussion of the reaches of morality dates back to Plato's 'Republic,' where Socrates asks Polemarchus about what justice (doing the morally right thing) entails. He replies that it's helping your friends and harming your enemies.
Traditionally, moral behavior was the way you treated those in your "in-group" as opposed to outsiders. Modern philosophers (such as Mill and Kant) have morality in strong families described in Banfield (1958) . The essence of Banfield's 'amoral familism' is that moral principles only applies to one's family.
Everyone outside the family are fair game to be exploited to forward the position of the family. As Putnam (1993, p. 88 ) puts it, "The absence of civic virtue is exemplified in the 'amoral familism' that Edward Banfield reported as the dominant ethos in Montegrano." 3 There is hence an alternative hypothesis where strong family ties are associated with low civic virtues based on Banfield (1958) , while Wilson (1993) argues for a strong family ties promoting high civic virtues.
I present systematic evidence on these hypotheses, which fill a void in the literature. I present both correlations and estimates with a causal claim that support Wilson. I find that family ties are strongly associated with attitudes that are important for building societies with higher mutual respect and fiscal capacity, attitudes I label 'civic virtues.' One such virtue is to not take advantage of other members of society, or impose on them, for personal gain. 4 These virtues facilitate cooperation among members of a community.
Individuals with strong family ties are more disapproving of tax and benefit cheating, black market activities, corruption, and lying in your own interest.
Individuals with strong family ties also think it is more important that children learn tolerance and respect. These attitudes may capture different facets of trustworthiness. The findings support the hypothesis that strong family ties help build a strong civil society, where individuals don't exploit other community members for private benefits in line with Wilson (1993) . Although some uncivic activities might build on strong family ties the results show that the detrimental effect of family ties does not generalize in the population. In fact, for the average person stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues.
My empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First I study correlations between attitudes that capture different facets of civic virtue and family ties. The analysis produces results that are consistent with Wilson's hypothesis. Second, to establish a direction of causality I study second generation immigrants in 29 countries who have parents born in 85 countries. I find that second generation immigrants' civic virtues are affected positively by their parent's background, where I use measures of family ties based on attitudes and behavior.
The influence of universalist versus limited morality on current outcomes is studied by Tabellini (2008 and . He argues that a more widespread adoption of universalist morals lead to better functioning institutions and better economic outcomes at the regional level. My results indicate one channel at the individual level that may promote universalist morals and contribute to better functioning institutions and other desirable outcomes. Authors such as Greif (2006) have argued for an important role of family structure in earlier economic development but that the family now has been superseded by other social institutions. My results point to the importance of the family in fostering beliefs that are beneficial for the success of the community, indicating the relevance of the family also in the current period. Furthermore, the results provide micro evidence on the cultural transmission of civicness that is at the core of Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer's (2010) model of regulation.
The ethos of 'amoral familism' in Banfield (1958) contains two parts. 5 The first part captures what Banfield labels offensive measures, that is, you should actively advance the position of your family relative to others. Offensive measures include exploiting others for your own benefit when possible, and reflect low trustworthiness. The second part of the ethos implies that you should beware of others trying to exploit you and use defensive measures. I evaluate the relationship between family ties and the offensive measures Banfield describes, as well as some defensive components.
My measures of family ties include both attachment to the family as discussed by Wilson and living arrangements as has been studied in the literature.
Both Reher (1998) and Todd (1990) distinguish family types by if adult children live with their parents. Duranton, Rodríguez-Pose, and Sandall (2009) find that the regional prevalence of historical family patterns are associated with different current outcomes at the regional level. My study adds to this literature by studying beliefs and outcomes among individuals.
The analysis contributes to the understanding of what builds state capacity, as analyzed by Besley and Persson (2011) . Disapproval of tax and benefit cheating, as well as disapproval of corruption, are essential parts of building an efficient state. Furthermore, civic virtues influence the civil society through cooperation in the labor market as well as regulation in the labor market as studied in Aghion, Algan, and Cahuc (2011) and Alesina, Algan, Cahuc, and Giuliano (2010). 6 Related is also Lucifora and Meurs (2012) who study whether the responsibility for providing care and education ought to rest with the family or society.
The results have implications that go beyond state capacity to resolve puzzles in public finance related to the low levels of observed tax evasion despite low detection probabilities. 7 I find that individuals with stronger family ties are more opposed to tax evasion. As many businesses are run by families, see Bertrand and Schoar (2006) , it may be part of the explanation of the limited evasion rates among the self-employed.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the data on the measures of family ties and civic virtues, as well as the empirical specification.
The following section presents the results on civic virtues and family ties. The analysis of the second generation immigrants is presented in section 4. The last section concludes.
2 Data and Specification I use two different data sets in the analysis. In the first part I use the integrated European and World Values Surveys (EVS/WVS). For the variables I focus on 6 Algan and Cahuc (2009) analyze civicness and labor market institutions across countries. 7 Even among the self-employed, who self-report their income and have the largest scope for evading taxes, evasion is low. Six out of seven tax payers with self-employment income do not evade taxes in Denmark, as found in the randomized experiment studied by Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, and Saez (2011). the survey covers 83 countries for up to five waves. The first wave was conducted in 1981-1984 and the last wave was in 2005-2008. The data includes information on a wide range of attitudes as well as standard demographic variables. In the final part of the analysis, where I study second generation immigrants, I use the European Social Survey (ESS).
Family Ties
The main variable of interest is family ties and how it is related to a range of attitudes. I use three different measures of family ties. The first measure is based on one question from the EVS/WVS. The question assesses how important family is in the person's life. The variable is closely related to the idea of family ties in Wilson (1993) as well as Banfield (1958) . Answers are recorded in four categories and range from very important to not at all important. I code the variable such that a higher value captures stronger family ties.
The second measure of family ties is based on the question above, the importance of family, and two other questions from the EVS/WVS. The second question asks the respondent to agree with one of the two statements: 1) Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them, 2) One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it. I code alternative 1) as expressing stronger family ties. The third question prompts respondents to agree with one of the following statements: 1) It is the parents' duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; 2) Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children. Again, I code alternative 1) as expressing stronger family ties.
As the second measure of family ties I summarize these three expressions of family ties by extracting their first principal component. 8 Results are very similar if I instead use the (normalized) average of the three variables.
The third measure of family ties is based on physical proximity. I consider the family ties to be strong if the individual lives with his or her parents. The ties are not strong if the person does not live with the parents. The variable captures directly Banfield's (1958) description of families as parents and children living in the same house. Reher (1998) discusses how coresidence of adult children and parents measure strong family ties. Todd (1990) discusses how adult children and parents living together signifies 'authoritarian' family structures, while labelling families where the grown up children move out as 'liberal. ' 9 The averages of the three measures of family ties are positively correlated.
However, the correlations are far from perfect. 10 It indicates that the measures based on attitudes and behavior capture different facets of family ties. Table   A1 presents the summary statistics for the EVS/WVS data across individuals.
Averages of family importance and two measures of civic virtues by country are presented in Table A2 . The strongest family ties are found in Indonesia and Guatemala, and the weakest in Hong Kong and Rwanda. that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives." Norms against taking advantage of others for personal benefit would also be part of the more narrow civic capital, defined as "those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities" by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2010). I focus on a set of variables that capture several dimensions of civic virtues.
Civic Virtues
The common denominator among these virtues is a trade-off between personal 9 Moreover, Todd (1990) also discusses how inheritance law divides family types into 'equal' and 'unequal.' Since I study individuals within country the direct effect of inheritance law is captured by the country fixed effect. 10 The correlation between the importance of family and the principal component of family ties is quite high at 0.78. The fraction who live with their parents has a much lower correlation with the principle component of family ties, at 0.58. gains at the expense of members of society. I consider it a civic virtue when individuals don't think it is right to exploit strangers for private benefits. It may be akin to the 'golden rule,' which states one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself.
To capture specific dimensions of civic virtues I turn to questions that assess how justifiable a range of activities are in the eyes of the respondent. The respondent is to say "for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between". The statements are "Cheating on taxes if you have a chance"; "Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled"; "Avoiding a fare on public transport"; "Paying cash for services to avoid taxes"; "Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties"; "Lying in your own interest"; "Throwing away litter in a public place"; "Driving under the influence of alcohol"; "Speeding over the limit in built-up areas"; "Smoking in public buildings"; "Failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle"; "Buy stolen goods." Answers to each statement are coded from 1, never justified, to 10, always justified. Wilson (1993) would argue that these behaviors can't be justified, either based on duty (being faithful to obligations), or sympathy. He discusses both tax cheating and lying explicitly.
The least justifiable behavior is driving under the influence, with an average of 1.5, and the most accepted behavior is smoking in a public building, with an average of 3.4. The majority of the observations are at the lower end of the range. The mode is 1, never justifiable, across all questions and in a majority of the questions the median is 1. This indicates that the norm is that none of these behaviors are justifiable. The countries with the strongest disapproval of someone accepting a bribe are Bangladesh and Malta, while the least disapproval are found in the former Soviet states (CSS) and the Philippines.
There could be a concern that individuals report a higher disapproval in order to "look good" to the interviewer, and such behavior could differ across countries. Since the main results are based on within country variation they are not affected by such differences. Yet, there is evidence that individuals report truthfully in surveys even if there are incentives to lie as analyzed by Abeler, Becker, Falk, and Seidmann (2011), which may alleviate such concerns. 11 Furthermore, I use several measures of civicness, presented below, that might be much less susceptible to the concern to "look good." I also consider qualities children can be encouraged to learn at home. The two dimensions I study focus on how we get along with people in society. The two qualities which the respondent may consider especially important are "Good manners" and "Tolerance and respect for other people."
Lack of control, that outcomes are determined by external forces, may make it harder to pursue socially valuable activities. Wilson (1993 Wilson ( , 1998 
Empirical Specification
I run a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the following form:
where the dependent variable captures the realization of a particular variable for individual  residing in country  at time , where time is given by the survey wave.  _  is the variable of main interest, which is increasing in the strength of family ties. The controls are included in   . I also include a full set of country-by-wave fixed effects, represented by   , which accounts for aggregate levels and time trends for each country. Hence, the variation I use to identify  1 is only due to differences in family ties within countries while also accounting for non-linear time trends within countries. 13 The results are robust to using an ordered logit or an ordered probit estimator.
Family Ties and Civic Virtues
Stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues across all measures. It suggests that family ties are a complement to these virtues, which are part of what is labeled social capital. The results support the idea that families transmit civicness.
The family ties measure line up with Northern European countries having weaker ties and more conservative and developing countries displaying stronger family ties. The measure of family ties hence show the pattern one might expect across countries based on Reher (1998) . All regressions include a set of demographic controls, as the attitudes I examine may vary with individual characteristics. I control for age and its square, gender, marital status, education, employment status, income, 14 and religion. Table 1 and 2 present the findings where family ties are measured by the importance put on family.
Family ties measured by importance of family
The estimated coefficient on family ties is negative and strongly significant across the specifications in Table 1 . Beginning with the first column, stronger family ties are associated with less justification of tax cheating. Hence, tax cheating, which may give private benefits at the expense of the anonymous tax payer, is tolerated less among those with strong family ties. The same goes for benefit cheating as seen in the second specification. The estimated coefficients are quantitatively significant. Consider the tax cheating estimates in the first column.
A one standard deviation increase in the strength of family ties corresponds to one and a half times the difference between having a college degree versus less than a high school degree. The results stands in stark contrast to the 'amoral familist' Banfield (1958, p . 92) describes, as "[i]t is taken for granted that all those who can cheat on taxes will do so."
Paying with cash to avoid taxes, a form of tax cheating, is seen as less justified among those with stronger ties. Furthermore, not paying for public transit is looked upon less keenly by those with tighter families. Getting private benefits at the tax payers' expense is less tolerated among those with stronger family ties.
Individuals with stronger family ties are more opposed to someone taking a bribe than those with weaker ties, as seen in column 5. It does not seem like strong family ties support an equilibrium with a high level of corruption, as predicted by Banfield (1958) . Telling the truth is another civic virtue that is cherished more among those with stronger family ties. Stronger family ties are associated with a lower acceptance of lying in your own interest. This attitude may make it harder to sustain an equilibrium with corrupt politicians.
Among the control variables it may noted that the self-employed are more accepting of tax cheating but less so regarding benefit cheating. 15 Part-time employees are more accepting of benefit cheating and riding public transit without paying the fare. Older individuals, women, Protestants, those married, and with higher education are associated with less accepting attitudes across the different dimensions in Table 1 . I present further evidence on how stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues in Table 2 . I find that also in these dimensions, which may be more mundane or more personal, manifestations of mutual respect are stronger for those with stronger family ties. Littering in a public place, which may be convenient for the individual but a nuisance to those using the public place, is less tolerated by people with strong family ties. Both driving under the influence and speeding in urban areas, which may give private benefits to the driver but put others at higher risk, are less acceptable to individuals with strong family ties, as seen in the second and third columns. Failure to report damage one has done by accident to a parked vehicle is less tolerated among those with strong ties. Disapproval of smoking in public buildings is stronger among those with tighter family ties, as is the disapproval of buying stolen goods.
The following two columns of Table 2 analyze the relationship between family ties and two qualities that are singled out as especially important for children to learn at home. The first is good manners. Manners are rules of conduct that may make it easier for people to get along in society. Living by these manners may come at a private cost, holding the door open for someone takes time that could be spent differently, and the good manners provide benefits to others in society, for example the person you hold the door for. Wilson (1993) argues that manners have evolved to display self-control and that you are not hostile to strangers. Repeated display of bad manners may indicate that "you do not have the state of character to restrain you from preferring your own immediate advantage over the more rightful and more distant interests of others," Wilson (1993, p. 85) . Individuals with stronger family ties think that it is more important that children learn good manners. Also in this dimension I find that stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues. I find the same result for the second child quality, tolerance and respect for other people, which may be one of the fundamental civic virtues. The stronger the family ties, the more important individuals think it is that children learn tolerance and respect for other people. This also points to a mechanism for the transmission of civic virtues. Individuals with strong family ties stress the importance of teaching children tolerance and respect for others. This intergenerational transmission mechanism may explain the presence of these civic attitudes within families with strong ties.
The last column examines the extent to which individuals think they can control their own lives. Wilson (1993) argues that strong families socialize their children to believe they can affect their outcomes. In contrast, Banfield (1958) noted the people in Southern Italy expressed a lack of control to change their lives. I find that individuals with stronger family ties express a higher freedom of choice and control over their lives, which support Wilson.
Family ties based on three attitudes
The results thus far were based on the question on how important family is.
Next, I use the principal component of three questions that capture family ties as defined above. This measure is naturally highly correlated with the importance of family since the question is one component, but the correlation of 0.78 shows that the measure captures different facets of family ties. The estimates of the variable of main interest, family ties, are presented in Table 3 . The results are very similar to Tables 1 and 2 . Stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues both with respect to disapproval of exploiting others, the child qualities, and the sense of control over one's life. The estimates on the 13 individual control variables are similar to those reported earlier.
Family ties measured by living arrangements
The third measure of family ties, whether the individual lives with his or her parents, is very different since it is based on behavior. The physical proximity to your parents would signal strong family ties. With this measure of family ties it is important to compare individuals with similar characteristics but who differ in their living arrangements, since the decision to reside with your parents may be influenced by your labor market outcomes for example. Accounting for these factors by controlling for labor market attachment, income, etc. is hence crucial. The results in Table 4 are similar to the previous tables, although not as strong. A majority of the estimates are significant, and all the significant estimates have the expected sign. 16 There is also some evidence of a complementarity across the different measures of family ties. I find those who express strong family ties and live with their parents in several cases are even more opposed to exploiting others for personal gain, compared to those who express as strong family ties but do not live with their parents. This compounding effect is also significant for the importance of children to learn tolerance and respect.
Heterogeneity in the family ties estimates
The estimates above indicate a robust influence of family ties on civic virtues on average across the world. As institutions and the level of development vary across the world these differences may affect the influence of the family on civicness. First I examine if the influence of family ties varies by continent. I interact dummy variables for the continents with family ties, measured by the importance put on the family as in Table 1 . I study two outcomes, approval of tax cheating and bribes. They are both important aspects of civicness and surveyed in the broadest set of countries. Model A in Table 5 present the estimates for the interaction terms. All the models in the table also include the individual controls and country by year fixed effects as in the earlier analysis. The estimated magnitudes on family ties are highest in Europe and Latin America, while Asia has the smallest estimates. The test of equality of the five estimates is rejected at very low levels of significance, indicating significant differences across continents.
In the next model I examine how the influence of family ties may differ by level of development. The family ties measure is interacted with dummies capturing OECD and non-OECD countries. The estimated magnitude is significantly larger among the more developed OECD countries compared to the non-members, see model B in Table 5 . It indicates that strong families are more effective in cultivating civic virtues in more economically and institutionally developed countries.
Further evidence for a complementarity between family ties and institutions
is found when studying political institutions. Family ties are interacted with dummies for being above or below the median value of democratization according to the polity2 variable from the Polity IV project. The magnitude of the family ties estimate is significantly higher for the more democratic countries, as seen in model C of Table 5 . Using the "voice and accountability" measure, that captures political freedom and the independence of the media, from the World Bank Governance Indicators yield similar results. 17 The estimate on family ties is higher in countries where the political process is more open and accountable, see model D in Table 5 .
The results from models B-D in Table 5 indicate a complementarity between strong families and the level of economic and political development. Families might be more effective in fostering civic attitudes in richer, more democratic, and open environments. It also suggests a more refined understanding of amoral familism. The village Banfield (1958) studied was not only characterized by strong families. It was also a very poor environment with badly functioning political institutions. It may be that an amoral familism develops in such an environment, but it might not generalize to richer and more politically developed contexts.
Charitable giving and family ties across countries
The measures of civic virtues are based on survey responses. Do the attitudes relate to how common these behaviors are? Studying behavior based on data from other sources provide additional evidence. The focus is on charitable giving as a manifestation of civic attitudes. Data on charitable giving as percent of GDP is available for 33 countries for which there is also data on family ties and level of development, see Salamon (2004) .
Charitable giving is regressed on family ties, measured as the average importance put on the family by country, as well as GDP per capita and democratization (measured by polity2) in the first three specifications of Table 8 . Family ties have a significant association with charitable giving indicating that civic attitudes fostered by strong family ties may translate into civic behavior.
To study if the association is stronger among the more developed OECD countries, as suggested in the previous section, I interact family ties with an indicator for if the country is an OECD member or not (21 countries in the sample are OECD members). Models with corresponding controls are estimated in the last three columns of Table 8 . The results reveal that the relationship is driven by the more developed OECD countries, where the point estimate is higher and significant. It further corroborates the interpretation that the influence of strong families on civicness is complementary with the level of development. 
Taking Stock
I find that in the dimension of civic virtues, habits of personal living that are claimed to be important for the success of the community, family ties are a complement to social capital. The estimates that stronger family ties are associated with stronger civicness, even interpreted as correlations, would challenge the generalizability to the general population of strong families breeding particularized morality. Rather, all the results are consistent with Wilson (1993) .
Moreover, the heterogeneity results suggest that the amoral familism Banfield (1958) described might be particular to poor contexts with badly functioning political institutions.
Evidence from Second Generation Immigrants
To establish a direction of causality, that family ties affect civic virtues, I study second generation immigrants. Fernandez (2010) describes how this approach can be used to study the causal impact of beliefs on outcomes, and reviews the literature. Most studies have used data from the U.S., but I contribute to an emerging literature studying immigrants in a wide range of European countries such as Luttmer and Singhal (2011) . I use data from the first four rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). I find that the results from the EVS/WVS above also hold in the analysis of second generation immigrants. By looking at many countries of residence for second generation immigrants, I consider 29 countries, I reduce the concern that the results are driven by conditions of one particular country. I also consider individuals with ancestry from a wide range of countries, up to 85 countries across the world, that reduce the concern that the results are particular to small number of ancestral backgrounds. The findings provide direct evidence of a causal effect of family ties on civic virtues, and on the cultural transmission of civic virtues within families.
Data
The ESS is conducted on representative samples in European countries. The questions in the survey cover a range of aspects including labor market attachment, attitudes toward society, as well as standard demographic characteristics.
One essential feature of the data is that the survey asks about the country of birth of the respondent as well as the country of birth of both parents. 18 This information allows me to identify second generation immigrants and which countries their parents originate from. Extensive documentation of the data is found at http://ess.nsd.uib.no.
I define a second generation immigrant as a respondent who is born in the country of residence but whose mother or father is born in a different country. I compute the measure of family ties in the parent's birth country as the country average of the variable in the EVS/WVS data, either as the fraction who live with their parents or the first principal component of the three questions as discussed above. The summary statistics for the second generation immigrants on the mother's and father's side, respectively, are presented in Table   A3 . There are no significant differences in the characteristics of those with immigrant mothers and fathers, and they are not significantly different from the rest of the population either. The participating countries in each round of the ESS are presented in Table A4 .
Dependent Variables

Civic Virtues
The ESS is relatively limited in the questions regarding civic virtues in comparison to the EVS/WVS. I have identified two questions that capture some facets of the civic virtues, habits of personal living that may be important for the success of the community, I examine in the EVS/WVS. The first question asks how important it is to help other people and care for their well-being.
This would capture an active part of civic virtues, that you should help and care for others. It is hence one degree stronger than civic virtues in EVS/WVS that focused on not harming or exploiting others. Helping others would be a manifestation of altruism, which is driven by a sense of sympathy fostered in strong families according to Wilson (1993) . The second question relates to the importance of behaving properly. Wilson (1993) discusses duty, being faithful to obligations, as a moral sense. It incorporates not acting in ways that would be considered unacceptable. Based on the analysis of acceptable behavior using the EVS/WVS and the population means I would argue that at least part of behaving properly reflects not exploiting others for personal gain.
Preceding the question is the statement "Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer." The first question is then "It's very important to her/him to help the people around her/him. She/he wants to care for their well-being." There are 6 possible answers on the card; "Very much like me"; "Like me"; "Somewhat like me"; "A little like me"; "Not like me"; "Not like me at all". I code "Very much like me" as 6 and each following answer with a lower digit down to coding "Not like me at all" as 1.
The second question is worded as "It is important to her/him always to behave properly. She/he wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong." The possible answers and their coding is the same as for the first question.
I also study two dimensions of uncivic action. These questions are included in one rotating module, which is only included in the second round of the ESS.
Hence, the sample is much smaller. The questions are preceded by the following statement "How often, if ever, have you done each of these things in the last five 
Empirical Specification
I run a number of OLS regression of the following form: causality is not a concern since the outcomes for a child residing in country  Moreover, the empirical approach produces a conservative estimate of  1 .
The underlying model would be that the parent's family ties would affect the child's outcome, but I use the average family ties in the parent's birth country as shifter that does not suffer from the reverse causality concern. 19 Since there is substantial variation in parents' family ties in a population the average level of family ties in the parent's birth country, the variable  _   in the analysis, is not perfectly related to the parent's family ties. This produces an attenuation bias in the method, biasing the estimate of  1 toward zero. The 19 The parent's individual value is not observed. I am hence estimating the 'reduced form.' estimate of  1 is hence conservative, and finding a significant effect in spite of this bias would be strong evidence that the effect is present.
Results
The 
Civic Attitudes
In the first specification of Table 7 I examine the effect of family ties in the mother's birth country on the respondent's expressed importance of helping others, the first measure of civic virtues in the ESS. In Table 7 I measure family ties by the fraction of individuals who live with their parents. A higher fraction measures stronger family ties. The estimated coefficient is positive and strongly significant. It means that respondents with a mother from a strong family ties country think it is more important to help others, compared to an individual living in the same country but with weak family ties ancestry. This is similar to the findings in the EVS/WVS that stronger family ties are associated with stronger civic virtues. However, by using the sample of second generation immigrants I can establish the direction of causality from family ties to civicness, as the family ties in the parent's country of birth is not endogenous to the respondent's outcome. In the second specification I consider the other measure of civicness, the importance of behaving properly. The point estimate is positive as expected and highly significant.
In the third and fourth specifications I regress the same measures of civic virtues on family ties, again measured as the fraction living with their parents, in the father's country of birth (for the sample of second generation immigrants with an immigrant father). For both measures the point estimates are positive and significant. 20 There is hence evidence of a causal impact of family ties from both parents. 21  22 The demographic variables display estimates similar to the earlier analysis,
indicating that the measures of civic virtues as well as the sample of second generation immigrants are similar to the previous analysis. As marriage may be a marker stronger of family ties it is particularly interesting. The point estimates on Marriage in Table 7 are all positive, and in all but one case strongly significant, which further corroborates the finding that stronger families are more civic.
Next, I examine the same questions with a different measure of family ties.
Instead of the fraction living with parents I use the average value of the principal component of the three family question, which I used in Table 3 above. The first two columns of Table 8 present the results for those with an immigrant mother.
The estimates are positive and strongly significant both for the importance of helping others and to behave properly as in the previous table. For those with a father who immigrated the point estimate in the case of helping others is positive as before but not statistically significant. The effect of family ties on the importance of behaving properly remains positive and strongly significant. 23 
Robustness
Could selection of immigrants affect the analysis? First, second generation immigrants have not chosen to move themselves, which mitigates such concerns.
Moreover, the second generation immigrants are highly integrated (96% are 20 The results are also robust to controlling for trust. 21 The results don't rule out a causal relationship from civic virtues to family ties. It is, however, not possible to estimate such a relationship since the ESS does not measure the strength of family ties. 22 I don't find a compounding effect of family ties on the child's civicness if both parents are born in the same country. The lack of compounding could be due to the nature of the 'production function' of civicness or due to the smaller sample size. 23 Also the results in Table 8 are robust to controlling for trust.
citizens of their country of birth), look similar to natives on observables, and display similar coefficients on the demographic controls in Table 7 . Anyway, there may be concerns that the parents are drawn from a particular part of the distribution. Such selection would not be a problem as long as it is uniform across countries since the identifying variation does not come from levels but differences across ancestral countries. Yet, it could be the case that individuals with weak family ties are more likely to migrate as argued by Algan, Alesina, Cahuc, and Giuliano (2010). Under the main hypothesis in this paper, that there is cultural transmission from family ties to civicness, selection based on weak family ties would tend to reduce the variation in the dependent variable civicness. Such selection would hence attenuate my estimate and bias it toward
zero.
Yet, there may be a concern that ancestry from a strong family ties country captures a less developed country ancestry, and that the level of development may confound the effect of family ties. There is a significant negative relationship between stronger family ties and income across countries. To separate the potential effect of family ties from economic development I control for ancestral country gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in logarithms.
To address potential parental sorting into migration I include controls for the mother's and the father's education. I create dummies for upper secondary and tertiary education. This shuts down any effect of family ties on civicness that would operate through parental education.
The models corresponding to Table 7 are estimated with these added controls: log ancestral GDP and four dummies for parental education. The results are presented in Table 9 . The estimate on family ties in the ancestral country is similar in magnitude and remain significant indicating that the main results are not influenced by these added controls. Ancestral GDP is insignificant throughout, indicating the level of development in the parent's country of birth does not drive the result. The parental education dummies are in most cases insignificant, indicating that it does not have an important impact on the child's civicness conditional on the other variables. I have also estimated the model corresponding to Table 8 with these added controls. Again, the results are very similar.
In the results presented I use all the available data. There may be a concern that the results are influenced by ancestries with few second generation immigrants in the data. The results are similar when including ancestral countries with at least 5, 10, 20, or 50 observations. The results are not driven by small immigrant groups.
Civic Behavior
Do the stronger family ties also affect civic behavior? I present evidence on two dimensions of uncivic behavior. Individuals with ancestry in countries with stronger family ties are less likely to report exaggerated or false insurance claims in the past 5 years, as seen in the first column of Table 10 . The estimated coefficient is strongly significant. Individuals are also less likely to have paid cash to avoid taxes, as the point estimate in column 2 is negative. The estimate is, however, not significant. The lack of significance may be due to that the question was only asked in one round of the survey, so the sample is much smaller.
When turning to the sample with immigrant fathers, the point estimate indicates that stronger family ties lead to less false or exaggerated insurance claims, although the estimate is not significant, as seen in column 3. The estimate on paying cash to avoid taxes is negative and strongly significant in the last column of Table 10 . The results provide some evidence that mothers and fathers may transmit values that affect different kinds of behavior. Evidence of differences in cultural transmission by mothers and fathers is also presented in Ljunge (2012a).
The asymmetric estimates for mothers and fathers also indicate that the effects are driven by socialization rather than some genetic transmission, which would have the same impact through both parents.
Tables 7 through 10 provide evidence on a constructive role for families.
Individuals with parents from countries with stronger family ties transmit a 25 more civic attitude to their children. It implies that parents from countries with stronger family ties socialize their children to be more civic, lending support to Wilson's (1993) predictions. Table 10 provides evidence on that family ties also promote more civic behavior. 24 
Conclusion
Are family ties a complement to or a substitute for social capital? The main result is that family ties are a complement to social capital, in the domain of civic virtues. I find that individuals in strong family networks are substantially more disapproving of tax and benefit cheating, corruption, and a range of other activities which involve a personal benefit at the expense of other individuals.
The findings support Wilson's (1993) hypothesis that stronger families tend to produce individuals with universalist values and challenge the idea that modern strong families promote a morality limited to the family or clan.
I argued that the dominant norms are to not accept tax cheating and other ways of exploiting or imposing on others based on the averages in Table A1 .
It could of course be that in some families with strong ties the norm is that one takes advantage of others by for example cheating on taxes and benefits.
From a perspective of limited morality it may be expected that strong families organize themselves to exploit others for their own gain. The data clearly speaks against this as the dominant norm across families, as stronger family ties are associated with less acceptance of exploiting others for personal gain. I also find that individuals with stronger family ties think it is more important that children learn to respect others. It provides an intergenerational transmission mechanism for civic virtues, which may explain the presence of civic virtues in tighter family networks.
The results from the analysis of second generation immigrants provide a causal link in these relationships. Stronger family ties make for stronger civic virtues both in terms of attitudes and actions. This provides evidence of ed- 24 The results question that 'amoral familism' is driven by strong families.
I have primarily focused on the attitudes towards using the offensive means of advancing the position of the family, by exploiting others. In the use of "defensive weapons" Banfield (1958, p. 125) mentions "stubborness, suspicion, secrecy, and lying." There is evidence that stronger family ties lead to more suspicion, see Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) , but the evidence presented here show that stronger family ties are associated with less lying. The evidence on the defensive measures is hence mixed, but the evidence of the offensive measures is uniformly inconsistent with an 'amoral familism' in strong families. While Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) find a negative influence of family ties on trust there is no such influence on trustworthiness.
As trustworthiness would be part of the offensive measures their finding also challenges the idea that stronger families tend to exploit others, in line with the findings presented here. Although there is evidence of amoral familism in some facets, like suspicion, the broader evidence presented here does not line up with the hypothesis of an 'amoral familism' in strong families. Taken together the evidence points to a moral, but suspicious, familism supporting the family values proposed by Wilson (1993) .
The results provide a more nuanced understanding of 'amoral familism.'
The village Banfield (1958) studied was not only characterized by strong family ties but also poverty and badly functioning political institutions. I find that strong families are more strongly associated with pro-social attitudes in more politically and economically developed countries. My results suggest that an amoral familism may not generalize to more developed societies. In fact, the results suggest that strong families and a high degree of democratization are complementary in producing pro-social attitudes, a component of social capital.
The results on the pro-social influence of strong families apply to the average person. Strong family ties might not promote civic virtues among all individuals in all situations. There may of course be circumstances where strong family ties promote arguably less civic activities such as nepotism. It might be worth mentioning that the Mafia, where the popular perception is that it is family based, is in fact not based on family ties as discussed in Gambetta (1993) .
The results support the idea that tightly knit groups, such as families, can promote habits that may be important for the success of the community, as suggested by Wilson (1993) . The findings provide a constructive role for families, as they may support communities with high levels of civic virtues and universalist values, in contrast the idea of limited morality in tightly knit families. Strong families benefit both family members as well as society as a whole. (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** Married where i is individual, c is country of residence, and t is time period. Country of residence-by-year fixed effects are captured by g ct . The dependent variable Y in columns (1)-(6) is coded from 1, never acceptable, to 10, always acceptable. In columns (7) and (8) Is it justifiable to: where i is individual, c is country of residence, and t is time period. Country of residence-by-year fixed effects are captured by g ct . The dependent variable Y in columns (1)-(12) is coded from 1, never acceptable, to 10, always acceptable. In columns (13) and (14) Notes: Each of the models A-D are estimates of family ties interacted with dummies. In model A the dummies capture continents and in model B OECD membership of the country. In model C a dummy is created based on if the country is above or below the median level of democratization as measured by the polity2 variable. In model D the dummy is based on being above or below the median (zero) for voice and accountability in the political domain as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicators. The dependent variable is coded from 1, never acceptable, to 10, always acceptable. Country of residence-by-year fixed effects and individual controls as in Table 1 are included in all models. The test of equality refers to the family ties interactions in each model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
where c is country. The dependent variable is charitable giving as percent of GDP. In columns (4)-(6) family ties is interacted with a dummy for OECD and non-OECD countries. Standard errors in parenthesis, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Y icat =b0+b1 Family_Ties a +b2 X it +g c +h t +e icat where i is individual, c is country of birth and residence, a is country of ancestry (a different from c), and t is time period. Country of residence fixed effects are captured by g c , and year effects by h t . The dependent variable Y is coded from 1, not like me at all, to 6, very much like me. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by the parent's birth country, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Y icat =b0+b1 Family_Ties a +b2 X it +g c +h t +e icat where i is individual, c is country of residence, a is country of ancestry (a different from c), and t is time period.
Country of residence fixed effects are captured by g c , and year effects by h t . The dependent variable Y is coded as 1 if true at least once, and 0 otherwise. Included individual controls are age and its square as well as dummies for female, married, never married, child at home, upper secondary degree, tertiary degree, out of the labor force, unemployed, low income, middle income, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox. Standard errors, in parenthesis, are clustered by the parent's birth country, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
